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This paper develops a dynamic model of Rational Partisan Business Cycles, wherein
wage contracts overlap elections and wage setters have to make a prediction about the
election result.  Uncertainty leads to pre- and post-election date output fluctuations.
Election result probabilities are imputed and then used to construct variables in electoral
uncertainty.  Using data from 20 OECD countries over the period 1960-1998 left wing
incumbents are found to increase output, but the increased expectation of a left wing
regime reduces it.  These political effects are found to be offset by Central Bank
Independence and in particular, objective independence.
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1. Introduction
Economists distinguish between two kinds of Political Business Cycle (PBC).
Opportunistic PBC’s are generated by politicians manipulating the business cycle to get
themselves re-elected (Nordhaus, 1975).  Partisan PBC’s result from systematic
differences between left– and right-wing governments (Alesina, 1987), and wage
contracts that overlap elections.  Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) find no evidence for
opportunistic PBCs.  The hypothesis also implies irrational behaviour unless voters are
badly informed about the competence of politicians (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988).  However,
the evidence for rational partisan cycles when applied to a panel of OECD countries was
more promising, if never resounding (Alesina, RC, 1997).
According to the ‘rational partisan’ theory, the economy is affected not just by the timing
of elections, but also by the electors’ anticipation of the result.  Thus a group of workers
may negotiate a year-long wage deal knowing that it will straddle an election, and the
contending parties have 2% and 10% monetary growth in mind respectively.  Rational
workers will go for an intermediate pay rise.  Hence, if the more anti-inflationary of the
two parties gets in, it kicks off with a rise in unemployment; if the “wetter” alternative
wins, it starts its term with a minor boom.
But what the workers go for will depend on who they expect to win.  If, for example, they
felt certain that an incumbent government was going to be re-elected, they would behave
exactly as if there were to be no election, and the election itself (assuming the3
government did get back) would have no effect on output.  In general, the more likely a
party seems to get in, the closer workers will pitch their pay claims to matching its
expected monetary policy.  Post-electoral shocks to output will thus be largest when the
election result was least expected.
Similarly, pre-electoral fluctuations will occur given that wage-setters anticipate electoral
changes at some time during their wage contract (Cohen, 1993).  The fluctuation
increases with the likelihood of a change of regime.  For instance if the incumbent right-
wing party were expected to lose an impending election, there would be a pre-electoral
recession as real wages increased.  The stronger the expectation, the bigger the wage rise
and the bigger  the recession.
Most research so far has ignored the question of the degree of ex ante uncertainty
associated with the elections, e.g. Paldam (1991), Alesina and Roubini (1992 and 1997)
and Hadri, Lockwood and Maloney (1998).  An exception is Carlsen and Pedersen
(1999), who estimate three series of election result probabilities for seven countries over
mixed time horizons, all of which require time series of opinion poll data.  The first two
series take the date of the election as fixed and the third makes it endogenous.  One
contribution of this paper is to derive these alternative probabilities of election results for
20 countries over the period 1960-1998.  Our approach is similar to Carlsen and Pedersen
but we extend their work in a number of important directions.  Firstly, the estimable
equation is formally derived from the incumbent government’s loss-minimisation
problem.  Secondly, 13 additional countries are analysed, and because we estimate4
probabilities for circumstances where opinion poll data is not available, our probability
series cover the full sample period.  Third, our theoretically derived output equation is
shown to depend on two political variables – the colour of the incumbent, and a measure
of the average expectation of the election result, whereas CP utilise a single composite
term.  Finally we also test the hypothesis that monetary policy constraints due to Central
Bank Independence (CBI) reduce RPBC induced volatility.  Using the recently developed
data set of Kilponen, Mayes and Vilmonen (2000) we also identify if and how successful
different ‘types’ of independent central banks are at reducing politically induced
macroeconomic volatility.
In section 2 the dynamic rational partisan model is developed, culminating in an
estimable output equation incorporating both economic and political variables.  In section
3 we explain how we estimate the electoral probability series.  In section 4 the data set is
applied to the model.  In section 5 we test the hypothesis that monetary policy constraints
reduced the effects of political variables on output.  Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
The government dislikes deviation in output (ys) from the full employment level (y), and
deviation in inflation (π s) from its own (partisan) preferred inflation rate (π
i).  This can be
characterised within a standard loss function,
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for i = L,R depending on the colour of the incumbent and a time subscript s.  At time t the
government therefore wants choose the inflation rate
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Minimisation of (2) is subject to a dynamic supply function,
( ) t t t t t z W y y + − + = − ˆ
1 π θ ρ ,        (3)
where 0 < ρ  < 1, zt is a supply shock with expected value zero, and  t W ˆ  is average
nominal wage growth at time t.  Output is measured in logs, and then passed through the
Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter so that the (log) natural rate is zero.  Differentiation of (2)
yields
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and similarly,
                                                          
1  In this formulation parties care equally about economic outcomes whether in office or not, and do not
adjust policies in the light of what they think successors might do.
2 Where ρ
s-t is the derivative of output in time s with respect to output in time t from equation (3).6
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We assume that expectations of inflation are formed rationally, i.e. π t+1= Et [π t+1] + vt+1
where vt+1 is a random error with expectation zero.  Solving (7) for inflation gives
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i
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and substituting (8) into aggregate supply (3),
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We denote this equilibrium rate in future by  *
i π .  Thus the Barro-Gordon inflationary
equilibrium for either a left- or a right-wing government is  () δρ α θ − 1 y  above its “bliss”
inflation rate.
2.2 Private Sector inflation expectations
These determine the wage inflation rate.  We initially follow Carlsen and Pedersen
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where wage contracts last N periods and the quadratic loss from inflation (π t) failing to
match nominal wage growth in that quarter (Wt) is discounted at some positive rate (δ ).
But when the contracts even just potentially overlap an election the wage setters will not
be certain of the inflation rate.  When the electoral terms are variable they write the cost
function as
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Where t’ is the (unknown) quarter in which the election takes place, Ptt’
L (Ptt’
R) is the
probability formed in period t of a left (right) wing victory in that quarter.  Differentiation
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where Lt is a dummy variable set equal to one when there is a left wing incumbent.  Since
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This reduces to
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and T is the fixed election date.










,      (16)
where Wτ  is described in (14) or (15) and fτ  is the fraction of wage contracts signed in
period τ .  If contracts are uniform, then fτ  = 1/N for all τ .
Expressions (14) and (15) give the wage growth rate for the two cases of variable and
fixed election dates.  Equation (16) gives the average wage growth rate.  The Carlsen and9
Pedersen formulation allows for varying probabilities of left wing and right wing
victories, and indeed of election dates.  They also allow for a variable wage contract
length, N and a positive discount rate.  Putting (14) and (15) into (16), we get nominal
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in the case of the fixed election dates.  The Et variable is composed of observable
variables (N and Lt), our estimated probabilities, and the quarterly discount rate which
following Carlsen and Pedersen we set to 0.99.  (Section 3 explains how the probabilities
are estimated.)  Note that Et can only take values between zero and unity, which means
average wage growth will in general be somewhere between the respective inflationary
equilibria of the two parties.  When a left (right) wing incumbent is expected to stay in
office for the duration for all of the contracts drawn up in the last N quarters, Et = 1(0),10
and points of uncertainty lie between these two limits.  The variable thus measures the
electoral uncertainty contained within the set of wage contracts that overlap a particular















In order to derive an estimable equation for output we return to equation (9), and replace
t W ˆ  with (17) or (18) and rearrange to yield:
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The reduced form of this estimable equation can be written as
t t t t t t u E b L b b y b b y + + + + + = + − 4 3 1 2 1 1 0 π .      (22)
Henceforth we refer to π t and yt as the ‘economic variables’ and Lt and Et as the ‘political
variables’.  The reduced form parameters of the VAR are described as follows:
() ()
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Tests of the rational political business cycle model under electoral uncertainty can be
performed by inference from the reduced form parameters b3 and b4.  In particular, we
expect the following restrictions to hold for our reduced form parameters:
b0 < 0; b1 > 0; b2 > 0; b3 > 0; b4 < 0.11
3. Computation of Election Win Probabilities
Constructing the Et variable means calculating prior election probabilities for all the
t-N+1 quarters for which period t lies within the wage contract.  (In each of these
quarters, a possible change of government during the life span of the contract will affect
the wage agreement.)  Carlsen and Pedersen (1999) describe three alternative measures of
election result probabilities.  We have extended their work to include 20 countries with
varying political frameworks and derive probability even where there is no opinion poll
data, so that a full series for all countries from 1960 onwards is estimated.  In this section
we concisely describe the methodology for computing these three probability measures.
For a much larger discussion see Maloney and Pickering (2000a).
3.1 Political Issues
The first issue is whom to classify as left or right.  Castles and Mair (1984), Huber and
Inglehart (1995), the World Values Survey and Eurobarometer all provide numerical
scores on a left/right continuum from 1 to 10.  Alesina and Roubini (1997) define actual
governments along similar lines as do Hadri, Lockwood and Maloney (1998).  We follow
the latter for our definitions, and then combine them with out measures of election result
probabilities (see above) to make probability estimates of whether there will be a left
wing or right-wing government.  In some cases this is straightforward.  In others,
assumptions have to be made about who is most likely to coalesce with who in the event
of no party getting an absolute majority.  We explain in more detail in the appendix, but12
in all 20 cases we take the probability of a right (left) government as the probability that
the right-wing parties will win more (fewer) seats than the left-wing ones.
3.2 Computation of Electoral Probabilities
We compare three methods.  Type A is the regression based probability series suggested
by Chappell and Keech (1988) (CK).  Where opinion poll data exists we follow Carlsen
and Pedersen and regress the incumbent seat shares in our sequence of elections against
recent historical opinion polls and macroeconomic data
3.  This gives us “predictions” of
the seats each party would have picked up in each quarter had there been a general
election then ( κ − T S ˆ ).  We then use the preferred prediction
4 for each pre-electoral quarter
to compute the probability, estimated from the standpoint of that particular quarter, of the
incumbent party or coalition getting more than half the seats at the forthcoming actual
election.  If we denote this as 
A



















5 . 0 ˆ
,      (23)
where t (.) is the standard cumulative t distribution, and  κ − T S ˆ  the preferred seat share
prediction using data available κ  quarters prior to the election, and sκ  is the standard error
of the regression.  The election quarter is represented by ‘T’ and probabilities are derived
for all pre-electoral quarters wherein wage contracts overlap the election date.  Where
opinion poll data was not available we regressed the change in incumbent seat share
                                                          
3 The macroeconomic data were output, inflation, unemployment, interest rates and first differences in all
of these.  The full output of these regressions is available on request (Maloney & Pickering, 2000a).
4 Selected on the basis of highest R
2.13
against macroeconomic variables.  This allowed for the existing size of the majority to be
taken into account.  We then summed the existing incumbent share and the swing for the
government to obtain a fitted seat share and derived probabilities as above.
The second approach follows Cohen (1993).  Here the probabilities are derived directly
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where Φ  is the cumulative standard normal distribution.  Alesina, Roubini and Cohen
(1997) find the poll data follow a random walk with zero mean, and we use this as an
assumption.  The poll data have been transformed (monotonically) into projected seat
shares via a preferred Votes Into Seats function estimated by OLS from actual election
results (see Maloney, Pearson and Pickering, 2001).  The country specific estimate of the
random walk’s standard deviation is represented by σ i.
The third probability series is proposed by Carlsen and Pedersen and allows for
variability in the date of the election.  This applies to most of the countries in the sample.
At any time t, the incumbent has a probability of winning (Pt
I), modelled using either
technique from above, so this element can easily be estimated.  There is also a probability
distribution for whether or not the election will actually occur within a particular quarter
(Pt
E).  Following CP we estimate Pt
E using a probit model where the dependent variable is
whether or not an election is called.  Given the increased constitutional diversity in our
sample we augment the CP regressors (length of time since last election and the poll lead)14
with additional political explanatory variables to account for the cases of minority
governments and a proxy for coalition stability.  Algebraically, the probability of the
incumbent winning at a particular quarter, t', in the future is written as
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Fitted probability estimates for the sets of Pt
I and Pt
E are substituted into (25) to derive the
variable election dates probability series.  Pt
E comes from the probit model, and Pt
I is
estimated from the best performing fixed election probability series (
A
T P κ −  or 
B
T P κ − ) where
the ‘best performer’ is the series, which gets the most predictions ‘right’ in the sense of
being the right side of 50-50.
Having computed the three probability series
5, we can construct our Et variable using
equations (19) and (20), hence capturing the essence of electoral uncertainty.  The two
dimensions of wage contract length (4, 6 or 8) and probability series chosen (types A, B
or C) yield nine alternative series for Et.  Table 1 details the Pearson correlations between
the series and reveals that the alternative methods lead to measures that contain similar
information.
Table 1 Correlation between alternative series for Et
EA8 EA6 EA4 EB8 EB6 EB4 EC8 EC6 EC4
EA8 1 0.991638 0.967472 0.966593 0.968374 0.956804 0.916332 0.929595 0.925136
EA6 1 0.988628 0.963281 0.976771 0.974727 0.917182 0.945047 0.951877
EA4 1 0.94923 0.971966 0.986449 0.903427 0.942568 0.968055
EB8 1 0.992064 0.969181 0.950493 0.952905 0.945344
EB6 1 0.989226 0.946141 0.963148 0.966581
EB4 1 0.928057 0.956973 0.977472
EC8 1 0.976103 0.923764
EC6 1 0.972005
EC4 1
                                                          
5 Also available on request.15
4. Estimation
4.1 Introduction
We use a two-stage approach.  In this section we test for the presence of rational partisan
business cycles as described by our model (equation 22) on a country-by-country basis
and within a panel
6.  In the next section we test whether and what type of central bank
independence reduces the RPBC
7.
4.2 Testing For The Rational Partisan Political Business Cycle
Here we investigate whether the identity of the incumbent and the probability of its re-
election affect output in the way that the RPBC theory suggests.  The fact that equation
(22) is under-identified, with 10 reduced form parameters and only 6 structural form
parameters, therefore does not matter.  We are interested purely in the sign and
significance of the reduced form parameters pertaining to our political variables Lt and Et.
Our macroeconomic data comes from the OECD database and covers 20 countries:
Australia, Austria, Belgium Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
                                                          
6 Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) who study RPBCs within 18 countries (our sample minus Greece and
Spain) undertake comparative work for the period 1960-1993.  This work does not address the probability
of the election result and uses partisan dummies (set equal to one for a right wing incumbent and equal to
minus for a left wing incumbent) to test for the RPBC.  Using a fixed effects model they find a significant
RPBC in output (ibid. ch.6).
7 Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (ibid. ch.8) describes the issue but in this case, they do not empirically
address the question.  Hadri, Lockwood and Maloney (1998) test for the effects of central bank
independence upon inflation and find some evidence in favour of the proposition that independent central
banks limit political effects.16
Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.  The output data is passed
through a Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter.  This removes the long-term trend in GDP but
leaves intact the cyclical component.  We are thus analysing deviations from the long-
term trend that are potentially induced by rational partisan variables.
As well as the regressors in (22) we employed dummy variables for the high oil price era
(1973-1986) (DO) and for the 1990s recession (D90).
There are nine (albeit highly correlated) alternative series of Et and nineteen
8 individual
countries.  The Et series generated by the probability measures proposed by Alesina,
Roubini and Cohen (ibid ch.5) (type B) in general gave less predictive power than the
other two measures for all three contract lengths, although this is likely to be largely due
to the smaller samples for which we had opinion poll data.  The evidence does not
provide clear-cut support for one contract length over another, although given the way
average explicit and implicit contract length varies from country to country this is to be
expected.  We select particular Et series on the basis of explanatory power, although the
results are robust to alternative series (unsurprising given table 1).  In table 2 the
regression
9 results using the preferred Et series for all the countries are presented.
                                                          
8 Omitting Switzerland, for which the same coalition has been in power throughout the sample period.
9 In estimating the output equation (22) we need to take into account the possible correlation that exists
between the regressor, π t+1 and the disturbance term.  In view of this, estimation is performed using
instrumental variables, with oil prices, narrow money growth, interest rates, lagged inflation and output as
the instruments.17









Australia C4 -0.0029 (0.0054) 0.0051 (0.0075) 5.89 {0.015} 9.41 {0.052}
Austria A4 0.022 (0.013) -0.023 (0.015) 5.31 {0.021} 19.1 {0.000}
Belgium A8 0.0093 (0.0027) -0.0069 (0.0044) 48.2 {0.000} 110 {0.000}
Canada C6 0.0076 (0.0035) -0.012 (0.0046) 4.31 {0.038} 7.31 {0.12}
Denmark B8 0.0028 (0.0032) 0.0004 (0.005) 11.53 {0.001}16.14 {0.003}
Finland A8 0.0022 (0.0053) 0.0006 (0.007) 1.67 {0.196} 14.61 {0.006}
France A8 0.013 (0.0052) -0.013 (0.0063) 6.84 {0.009} 12.6 {0.014}
Germany B8 -0.0086 (0.010) 0.013 (0.013) 0.030 {0.86} 18.9 {0.001}
Greece C8 0.015 (0.003) -0.024 (0.005) 39.6 {0.000} 98.6 {0.000}
Ireland A8 0.017 (0.012) -0.054 (0.016) 45.2 {0.000} 98.1 {0.000}
Italy C8 0.0012 (0.003) -0.011 (0.006) 14.9 {0.000} 24.2 {0.000}
Japan C6 -0.0026 (0.006) -0.013 (0.010) 0.498 {0.480}12.7 {0.012}
The Netherlands C4 0.0036 (0.0035) -0.009 (0.004) 22.4 {0.000} 3.46 {0.484}
New Zealand A4 0.012 (0.025) 0.005 (0.029) 7.70 {0.006} 13.51 {0.009}
Norway A4 0.0084 (0.007) -0.0053 (0.008) 6.95 {0.008} 9.95 {0.041}
Spain
13 C4 0.011 (0.010) -0.014 (0.011) 3.56 {0.059} 39.5 {0.000}
Sweden A6 -0.0023 (0.007) 0.011 (0.009) 3.85 {0.050} 11.7 {0.019}
United Kingdom A4 0.0068 (0.007} -0.0052 (0.0077) 0.024 {0.876}8.90 {0.064}
United States A8 0.0011 (0.004) -0.00005 (0.005) 0.680 {0.41} 18.6 {0.001}
The signs of both political parameter estimates are correct in twelve out of nineteen
cases
14.  Of these twelve, in eight cases at least one of the parameter estimates was
significant at the 5% level.  Of the seven that exhibited incorrectly signed parameter
estimates, none were significant even at the 10% level.  However, the diagnostic tests
indicate the presence of both ARCH and serial correlation.  The finding of serial
correlation (in 14/19 cases) is of particular concern because in the presence of a lagged
                                                          
10 Values in (.) denote standard errors, values in {.} denote p-values here and in what follows.
11 The Lagrange multiplier test for ARCH (Engle, 1982), based on an auxiliary regression of 
2 ˆ
t u  on a
constant and the lag of 
2 ˆ
t u . TR
2 (where T is the number of observations) from this regression is distributed
asymptotically χ
2(1).
12 The Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier test for serial correlation, based on an auxiliary regression of
t u ˆ  on the explanatory variables and four lags of  t u ˆ . TR
2 from this regression is distributed asymptotically
χ
2(4).
13 Estimation over the period 1977(1)-1998(4), the period during which democratic elections took place in
Spain.18
dependent variable this may bias the political parameter estimates.  To correct for serial
correlation generalised differencing is employed, depending on significance levels in the
autoregressive error process.  The resulting equations were estimated using non-linear
instrumental variables and the corrected results are presented in table 3.
Table 3 Regression results from output equation, correcting for Serial Correlation.
Country b3 b4 ARCH test SC test Correction
15Lt-Et
correlation
Australia -0.0029 (0.0058) 0.0043 (0.0098) 0.184 {0.67} 5.07 {0.28} SC(3) 0.91
Austria 0.011 (0.015) -0.011 (0.016) 0.880 {0.35} 7.26 {0.12} SC(6,8) 0.97
Belgium -0.0028 (0.0066) 0.0073 (0.0098) 0.094 {0.76} 31.6 {0.00} SC(1,4,5) 0.78
Canada 0.0052 (0.0046) -0.013 (0.006) 1.636 {0.20} 10.1 {0.04} SC(1,8) 0.89
Denmark 0.0042 (0.0055) -0.0067 (0.010) 3.28 {0.070} 5.02 {0.28} SC(1,3,8) 0.81
Finland 0.0079 (0.0074) 0.0065 (0.017) 0.373 {0.54} 7.97 {0.093} SC(2,3) 0.87
France 0.059 (0.023) -0.020 (0.16) 2.46 {0.12} 10.64 {0.031} SC(1) 0.91
Germany -0.010 (0.011) 0.014 (0.017 0.06 {0.81} 12.65 {0.013} SC(3) 0.95
Greece 0.015 (0.018) -0.025 (0.028) 23.8 {0.000} 13.1 {0.011} SC(2,3) 0.87
Ireland -0.0036 (0.0031) 0.0039 (0.0046) 0.23 {0.63} 18.8 {0.001} SC(1,4,5) 0.90
Italy 0.0049 (0.0044) -0.022 (0.012) 8.54 {0.003} 7.54 {0.101} SC(1) 0.64
Japan 0.0061 (0.0066) -0.034 (0.020) 0.15 {0.70} 5.03 {0.28} SC(2,3) 0.51
The
Netherlands
0.0036 (0.0035) -0.009 (0.004) 22.4 {0.000} 3.46 {0.484}  – 0.88
New Zealand-0.027 (0.080) 0.083 (0.16) 0.83 {0.36} 3.56 {0.468} SC(3) 0.96
Norway 0.0013 (0.010) 0.014 (0.023) 1.85 {0.17} 8.19 {0.085} SC(3,8) 0.90
Spain 0.0057 (0.0078) -0.0051 (0.0089) 6.02 {0.014} 23.4 {0.000} SC(1,6) 0.98
Sweden -0.007 (0.008) 0.020 (0.012) 6.47 {0.010} 5.66 {0.23} SC(4) 0.93
United
Kingdom
0.0068 (0.007} -0.0052 (0.0077) 0.024 {0.876} 8.90 {0.064}  – 0.96
United
States
-0.0006 (0.005) 0.0033 (0.006) 0.80 {0.37} 11.36 {0.023} SC(1) 0.93
In table 3 left wing governments positively affect output in 12/19 cases, and Et negatively
affects output in 10/19 cases.  Of the incorrect cases, none are significant at the 5% level.
                                                                                                                                                                            
14 Switzerland is omitted because there was no change of government over the sample period.
15 SC denotes non-linear estimation of equation (22) with AR errors, i.e. ut = et + ρ 1ut-1 + ρ 2ut-2 + … ρ jut-j.
The number in parentheses following SC indicate which of the ρ j were allowed to be non-zero in the final
estimation.19
A number of econometric issues arise out of estimation on a country-by-country basis.
Firstly the consistent finding of serial correlation points towards dynamic effects outside
the context of our model, i.e. higher orders of autocorrelation.  To overcome this we
include additional endogenous variable lags in subsequent estimation.  Secondly, the
estimates of the political parameters are insignificant in most cases.  There are a number
of possible explanations for this.  One is that there really is no rational partisan business
cycle, although this contradicts the previous work by Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997)
and Carlsen and Pedersen (1999).  Alternatively the large standard errors may be
attributable to collinearity between Lt and Et.  Suppose, for example, that it is 6 quarters
before an election, and contracts last 8 quarters.  Then for 6/8 of the life of contracts now
being signed, Et will equal Lt.  Much of the information contained in one variable is
contained in the other.  Individual correlation coefficients are reported in the last column
of table 3 and in most cases are very high.  Consequently, we should expect lower levels
of significance than in previous studies that only use one variable to capture PBC type
effects.  Nonetheless, where significance levels are high, then we may argue along a
fortiori lines that the expectation variable does have an impact upon the RPBC.  When
we pool across countries, a much sharper picture emerges (table 4):20
Table 4 Output panel
Summary of panel estimation Estimate (Std Error)
Political
Variables
Lt 3 ˆ b  = 0.0019 (0.0012) {0.11}
Et 4 ˆ b  = -0.0029 (0.0015) {0.055}
Fixed Effects None significant at 10%
Output lags Lags 1-4, 6, 8-9, 11, 14 & 16 significant at the 5%
level











Lt 3 ˆ b  = 0.0011 (0.0002) {0.000}
Et 4 ˆ b  = -0.0018 (0.0003) {0.000}
Hypothesis test: H0:  3 ˆ b  =  4 ˆ b  = 0 χ
2 = 18.32 {0.000}
Our initial regression (top half of table) gives emphatic evidence of the presence of
ARCH under which the estimators are not the most efficient available.  After correction
for fourth order ARCH we find both political parameters correctly signed and significant
at the 1% level; furthermore |b4| > b3 as predicted by the theory.  In no cases are the fixed
effects significant, but a considerable number of lagged observations of the endogenous
variable are.  Inclusion of these extra lags is endorsed by the improved serial correlation
statistic, which is insignificant at the 5% level.  The joint hypothesis that both political
variables do not influence the macroeconomic variable in question can be strongly
rejected.21
As a test of our methodology, the model is also estimated for a reduced sample of
countries where the left-right distinction is arguably less ambiguous.  This reduced
sample omits Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands and Switzerland.
The results are presented in table 5.
Table 5 Output panel, Reduced Sample
Summary of panel estimation Estimate (Std Error)
Political
Variables
Lt 3 ˆ b  = 0.0022 (0.0013) {0.107}
Et 4 ˆ b  = -0.0010 (0.0016) {0.52}
Fixed Effects None significant at 10%
Output lags Lags 1-4, 6, 8-9, 14 & 16 significant at the 5%
level











Lt 3 ˆ b  = 0.0011 (0.0008) {0.111}
Et 4 ˆ b  = -0.0002 (0.0007) {0.59}
Hypothesis test: H0:  3 ˆ b  =  4 ˆ b  = 0 χ
2 = 6.549 {0.010}
The results of the reduced sample mirror those of the full sample; the parameter estimates
are robust to the smaller sample size, although in the smaller sample there is a
deterioration in significance levels.  However, the joint hypothesis confirms that the
political variables influence the macroeconomic variables in the same way as in the full
sample.22
The RPBC theory described in section two suggests a number of testable hypotheses.
First, following an election output will be higher (lower) when a left (right) wing party is
elected.  In common with previous studies we find this to be true.  Second, this effect is
stronger the more surprising that result; and third, before an election the more expected
an incumbent victory the smaller the fluctuation, the more expected an opposition victory
the greater the fluctuation.  The second and third hypotheses are jointly tested by the
reduced form parameter on Et: they imply that b4 will be negative.  So it is: significantly
so.  This is an important new result and a major refinement of the rational partisan
political business cycle theory.  As a test of the theory, and also as an important policy
issue the focus now switches to the question of whether or not monetary policy
constraints, and in particular independent central banks, can reduce the political volatility.
5.  Monetary Policy Constraints
A government’s ability to run the economy in a partisan way depends on its ability to
manipulate monetary policy.  We focus on two monetary policy constraints, Central Bank
Independence (CBI) and fixed exchange rates.  Economists have looked long and hard at
CBI as a restraint on damaging, politically determined macroeconomic policy
16, while
fixed exchange rates render monetary policy ineffective in the Mundell-Fleming model
17.
                                                          
16 Rogoff (1985) finds that delegation of policy to a credible independent central bank increases economic
welfare.  Relevant empirical work includes that of Alesina (1988), Alesina and Summers (1993), Grilli et al
(1991) and Cukierman (1992).
17 Mundell (1968) and Fleming (1962).23
We therefore augment the RPBC model in equation (22) with additional variables for
central bank independence, fixed exchange rates and ‘interaction terms’ where for
example the degree of central bank independence influences the effect of political factors
upon the macro variables.  Because the legislature of central banks does not tend to
change much through time, it is especially important to focus on panel estimation; banks
vary across countries, but not across time.
For our measures of CBI we use the Cukierman unweighted legal index (LVAU) and a
new data set developed by Kilponen, Mayes and Vilmonen (2000) (KMV).  The LVAU
index is the most widely known index and was recently updated
18 by Schrijner and van
Lelyveld (2000).  The KMV dataset contains the component parts of the original
Cukierman index, defined as ‘Personnel Independence’ (PERI), ‘Political Independence’
(POLI), ‘Objective Independence’ (OBJE) and ‘Financial Independence’ (FINI) and
extends it throughout the 1990s
19.  These are individually constructed from updated
responses to the Cukierman questionnaire
20.  These specific measures of CBI are all in
turn used in subsequent analysis in order to overcome one of the objections to measures
of independence that the aggregated measures incorrectly weight variables.  A final
index, which we denote as KMV is constructed as an unweighted average of PERI, POLI,
OBJE and FINI.  All measures take values between 0 (no independence) and 1 (complete
independence).
                                                          
18 Cukierman’s original index ends in 1992.
19 Data for financial independence was unavailable for the case of Ireland.
20 We refer the reader to Cukierman (1992) Appendix A for more details on the coding procedure, and
Kilponen, Mayes and Vilmonen for details on their specific measures.24
Some have doubted whether CBI can ever be measured accurately (for example see
Forder 1998), but we argue that whilst measurement has its problems, refusal to measure
is much worse (Maloney and Pickering, 2000b).  Furthermore, our analysis uses several
alternative measures and in doing this we can or at least try to establish which ‘types’ of
CBI reduce the RPBC (or, if independence is thought to be indefinable, simply which
types of central bank.)
The monetary policy constraint augmented model for estimation is written as
= it y it t t it it k it
k
k it i CBI b D b DO b E b L b y b b b b 7 6 5 4 3
1
2 1 1 0 0 90 + + + + + + + + −
=
−  π
t it it it it it it it it it u DF E b DF L b CBI E b CBI L b DF b + + + + + + 12 11 10 9 8 ,      (26)
where the i subscript refers to individual countries, CBIit is the degree to which a central
bank is independent and DFit is a dummy variable set equal to one when there is a fixed
exchange rate.  The country specific intercept terms, b0i capture the fixed effects.  There
are k lags for output in order to capture dynamic effects and to reduce serial correlation.
The CBI measure and the fixed exchange rate dummy are used as regressors in their own
right.  There are four interaction terms, which are the products of the two political
variables and the two monetary policy constraints.
If the theory is correct, and if the measures of CBI are sufficiently accurate, then the
estimated coefficients of these interaction terms ought to be the opposite sign of the
estimated parameter of the relevant political variable.  That is, given b3 > 0 and b4 < 0
then, if increasingly independent central banks and fixed exchange rates reduce these25
political effects, b9, b11 < 0, and b10, b12 > 0.  Equation (26) was estimated
21 using the
alternative measures of Central Bank Independence, omitting Ireland, for which our set of
measures is incomplete.  Table 6 presents the estimation results for the parameters
corresponding to the political and institutional variables, first for the full sample, then for
the reduced sample of 13.
                                                          
21 Again, via maximum likelihood following a correction for fourth order ARCH.26
Table 6a Estimation of equation (26), full sample excepting Ireland.
Output
Equation






























































































































































0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.161 0.000 9900.45
                                                          
22 Joint Hypothesis Aπ  is defined as H0:b7=b8=b9=b10=b11=b12=0; joint hypothesis Bπ  is defined as H0: b9=b10=b11=b12=0; joint hypothesis Cπ  is defined as H0:
b7=b8=b9=b10=0; joint hypothesis Dπ  is defined as H0: b7=b8=b11=b12=0; joint hypothesis Eπ  is defined as H0: b9=b10=0; joint hypothesis Fπ  is defined as H0:
b11=b12=0 joint hypothesis Gπ  is defined as H0: b7=b8=0.27
Table 6b Parameter Estimates – Reduced sample
Output
Equation





























































































































































0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.790 0.000 6544.9529
In both samples, the original political parameters (b3 and b4) retain their sign and
(especially within the reduced sample) increase their significance.  This one might
expect given that the previous estimation made no distinction between regimes that
were policy constrained and those that were not.  In the full sample both these
political parameters are significant at the 1% level for all CBI measures except
personnel independence (PERI)
23.
A considerable result in the full sample is that in every case the CBI interactive terms
exhibit the ‘correct’ sign, offsetting the expansionary effects of a left wing incumbent
and contracting effect of the Et variable, and in many cases significantly.  In both
samples the parameter estimate for b9 (corresponding to the L-CBI interactive term)
was negative and significant
24 at the 5% level for all measures of CBI.  This provides
significant evidence that independent central banks offset the expansionary tendency
of left wing governments.  This effect was most pronounced in the cases of the two
composite CBI terms, LVAU and KMV, and the objective independence measure
(OBJE), although was present for all measures.  The evidence was less strong that
independent central banks dampen the political effects as captured by the Et variable,
                                                          
23 The significant positive coefficient on b7 (in all cases except PERI and FINI in the full sample), and
significant negative coefficient on b8 are intriguing.  Remember that the data has gone through a
Hodrick-Prescott filter, so that b7 is measuring not whether CBI raises output but whether it raises
output above trend.  Given that, across the majority of business cycles in the majority of countries, the
status of the central bank stayed the same, the significant parameter suggests a particularly strong effect
in the minority of cases where there was a change.  Why should making a central bank more
independent intensify a cyclical boom or mitigate a cyclical slump?  Perhaps the causality is the other
way: governments have a particular propensity to give a bank more free rein when an economy has
recently come out of a recession but the ensuing boom has not yet begun to give trouble.  This is, after
all, likely to be the stage of the cycle where the government and the bank have least to disagree about.
A similar story might explain the negative coefficient on b8 (particularly marked in the reduced
sample).  Governments may be more inclined to enter fixed exchange rate regimes at the cusp of a
recession, and/or perhaps more relevantly inclined to liberate their currencies at the end of one,
although future research is required for verification of such stories.
24 The estimated coefficients for b9 are often greater than those for b3.  This does not mean that central
banks exert an ‘anti’ politically cyclic influence because in most cases the CBI measures are
substantially less than unity.30
but in the full sample b10 exhibited the correct sign in all cases and in the reduced
sample was incorrect, but highly insignificant in only one case.
The interactive terms on the fixed exchange rate dummy fared less impressively – the
estimates for b11 and b12 are insignificant in all cases.  However, the policy constraint
that fixed exchange rates impose is of course limited to monetary policy, and within
the Mundell-Fleming model renders fiscal policy particularly effective.  It is therefore
not really surprising that this monetary policy constraint does not reduce politically
induced macroeconomic fluctuations.
The likelihood function values supported the use of the objective independence
measure.  The composite measures, LVAU, and KMV also scored quite well,
although this presumably is on account of their inclusion of the factors represented by
objective independence.  Personnel independence, policy independence and financial
independence, whilst still individually apparently mitigating the PBC
25 fare less
successfully.  Objective independence might be expected to be the best measure of the
effects of CBI, as the delegation type arguments rely upon Central Banks having
precisely this characteristic.  Ability to appoint your own board of governors, for
example, is useless if inflation objectives are still set by politicians.  Even the ability
to set the interest rates may have little stabilising effect if politicians have set the
target inflation rate.  On the other hand, if the central bank is allowed to prioritise
macroeconomic objectives, then there is a real potential for reduced political
macroeconomic volatility.
                                                          
25 That these measures reduce the PBC by themselves may be a spurious inference.  Increases in
personnel, policy and financial independence tend to accompany increases in objective independence.31
6. Conclusions
In this paper a model of rational partisan political business cycles was derived and
estimated for 20 OECD democracies.  With a RPBC, output depends not just on who
wins an election, but by how surprising its victory was – wage-setters’ political
expectations will affect output both before and after the election.  The more inflation-
averse the actual government, the lower the output after an election.  But the more
inflation averse the expected government is, the higher the output on both sides of the
election.  We estimate all these predicted effects and find all the relevant parameters
significant and correctly signed.  However, we also find central bank independence
significantly reduces each one of these effects.  The exact result depended on the
exact measure of CBI – of which we tried out six.  As might have been expected, the
measure of CBI that gave the best likelihood was that measure which captured
objective independence.32
APPENDIX
ESTIMATING THE PROBABILTIES OF LEFT- AND RIGHT-WING
GOVERNMENTS
The most common political system (type 1), characterising 15 of our 20 countries, is
one where two large parties, or coalitions of parties, alternate in office, with one party
or coalition unambiguously to the left of the other.  Here successive governments are
easy to classify as Left or Right.  The second most common system (Belgium and the
Netherlands) is where there is a large Centrist party, which spends all or most of the
time in power, either by itself, or in coalition with a left- or a right-wing party or
grouping.  Each of the three remaining countries (Italy, Ireland and Switzerland) has
idiosyncratic political systems that we treat on an ad hoc basis.
In type 1 countries, we classify the two large parties, or coalitions, as left and right.
Centre governments come about only when the two big players unite in a grand
coalition (e.g. Germany from 1966-9).  Parties which have only held office as part of
the left (right) coalition we classify as left (right).  Parties which have been part of
both left-wing and right-wing coalitions we classify as centre.  Parties which have
never been in office we classify as Centre unless there is evidence to the effect that
they would contemplate joining one, but only one, of the major parties/blocs.  Thus,
e.g. the UK Liberals (latterly Liberal Democrats) are counted as centre until after the
1992 election, at which point they made it clear that in a hung parliament they would
not keep the Conservatives in power.  One rather paradoxical result of this is that
parties so extreme that all other parties would shun or be shunned by them count as
Centre!  But Centre, here, merely means neutral, for practical purposes, between the33
main Left and Right groupings.  We assume that voters in these countries always
expect either a left or right government (i.e. centre governments are a complete
surprise.)  The probability of a left (right) government is thus simply the probability
that the parties classified left will have more (fewer) seats than those classified right.
When Centre governments do occur, we give the L dummy a value of 0.5.
For Belgium and the Netherlands, we assume that the only possible results voters
consider are the Centre governing on its own, a centre-left coalition and a centre-right
coalition.  We classify the last two as Left and Right respectively, given that they are
most left- and right-wing regimes of which voters entertain any possibility.  Voters
expect the centre to govern on its own if and only if it wins an absolute majority of
seats.  The probability that it will fail to do this is thus the combined probability of a
centre-left and a centre-right coalition.  But how do voters split up this combined
probability?  We assume that they do so on the basis of the centre party’s history of
choosing coalition partners.  In Belgium we assume that voters assume that the
(Centrist) Christian Social Party will choose the larger of the (Right wing) Liberal and
(Left Wing) Socialist Parties as coalition partners.  In fact, the Liberals have polled
less than the Socialists at every election, but nonetheless partnered the Christian
Social Party on three of the twelve occasions.  However, closer examination of the
pattern of coalition choice does not reveal any better alternative to our assumption.  In
the Netherlands, the centre party (Christian Democratic Appeal), until 1997, always
chose the Liberals as coalition partners unless it was the case that only the Socialists
would give them a combined majority.  We thus take the probability of the CDA and
Liberals getting (not getting) an absolute majority as the probability of a right (left)
wing government, conditional on the probability of the centre not governing alone.34
In Ireland, three of the four main parties (Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and the Progressive
Democrats) are of much the same ideological ilk on economic issues, with the fourth
party, Labour, well to their left.  Since Labour has never governed alone, we classify
governments in which it shares power as left and governments excluding it as right.
So how might Irish voters forecast whether Labour will be in the post-election
government? Again, we assume they go on past history.  Labour has got into power
when, and only when, its vote has exceeded or equalled
26 the difference between the
Fianna Fail and Fine Gael votes, and latterly the difference between the sum of the
larger of these two parties and the Progressive Democrats and the smaller party
27.
The probability of this situation occurring we thus take as the probability of a left-
wing government.
Italy is a difficult case due to the large number of changes of government between
elections.  In addition, for most of the sample period the makeup of the governing
coalition has little relationship with the seat shares of the parties.  Italy has fluctuated
between Christian Democrat minority governments, coalitions where the Christian
Democrats are supported by relatively centrist of the minor left wing parties, and what
we might term Quasi-Grand Coalitions (with clear electoral majorities) where these
parties have also been supported by more distinctly left-wing parties, in particular the
Socialists (but never the Communists).  Which of these materialises does not have a
                                                          
26 As in the 1992 election.
27 In practice the Fianna Fail party has always been the larger. We hesitate to formally state that the
Progressive Democrats are always allies of Fianna Fail, indeed the Progressive Democrats have worked
with Fine Gael on occasion, for example opposing the calling of the early 1989 election. For the
purposes of deriving expectations of government formation we are effectively asking if the Fine Gael
plus the Labour vote will be sufficiently great to prevent Fianna Fail or Fianna Fail and the Progressive
Democrats from forming a government. Thus, in 1992, even though the actual government was formed
by Fianna Fail and the Labour party, we are assuming that it was the above condition that led to this
result.35
clear relationship with the outcome of elections.  Here we resort to 50-50 election
result probabilities in the absence of alternatives.
If Italy is the hardest case, Switzerland is the easiest.  The same four parties have been
in the same coalition since 1959 and we thus treat it as if it never has elections.36
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